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MOVING BEYOND MEDIA FEAST AND
FRENZY: IMAGINING POSSIBILITIES
FOR HYPER-RESILIENCE ARISING FROM
SCANDALOUS ORGANIZATIONAL
CRISIS
RONALD L. DUFRESNE*
JUDITH A. CLAIR**
I
INTRODUCTION
When an organization finds itself mired in scandalous crisis, it is often
impossible to see the proverbial light at the end of the tunnel—or to imagine
that anything good can be realized once the organization emerges from that
tunnel. Most organizations consider themselves lucky should they survive the
crisis while retaining even a fraction of their reputation or public trust.
Returning even to the status quo might be hailed as a feat of true organizational
resilience.
As organizational scholars in schools of management, we research
organizational crisis and error from an organizational behavior perspective.
Research on organizational crises and crisis management is a longstanding,
cross-disciplinary tradition with roots in sociology, psychology, political science,
communications, and public relations, among other fields. Here we employ an
organizational perspective in considering how organizations can quell crises that
have spread far beyond their organizational borders. In particular, we share a
special interest in understanding how organizations can be “hyper-resilient” in
the face of a crisis so that they are not just quickly returning to the status quo
once the dust settles, but rather using the crisis as a springboard to becoming
even better than before. In light of our interest in how organizations can
transcend resilience, we explore here how organizations can turn the poison of
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scandalous crisis into an opportunity for renewal and test the limits of our
thinking in the context of the high-profile Duke lacrosse scandal. But first, what
is meant by “organizational crisis,” and how does a high-profile scandal such as
the one involving the Duke lacrosse players represent such a crisis?
II
HIGH-PROFILE SCANDAL AS A TYPE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS
An “organizational crisis” begins as an organizational problem. One way of
determining when it becomes a crisis is by considering what such incidences as
product tampering, employee violence, or senior-management fraud have in
common.1 Each of these events presents some form of threat to a central
product or service line, an essential business unit, or the organization as a
whole.2 Any event that threatens the well-being and safety of the organizational
community, the community members outside of the organization, or the
legitimacy of, or public trust in, an organization, can truly be called a crisis.3
Further, organizational crises are events that hyperextend the organization’s
resources and capacities and involve high-impact decisions that take it into
uncharted waters.4 Even those organizations that have excellent problemsolving skills find that they are threatened by the nature and complexity of the
problems encountered in a crisis.
Whereas all organizational crises share some basic features, high-profile
scandals present special challenges. Such cases are notable in that they involve
especially intensive media and public scrutiny of the events in question and of
the individuals and organizations involved or implicated. It is indeed the public
response that defines a scandal: “A transgression that became known to others
but elicited no response from them would not give rise to a scandal, since
scandal is shaped as much by the response of others as it is by the act of
transgression itself.”5 Although scandals have long been mediated by
technologies—dating back to broadsheet newspapers—in the age of Internet,
anyone can jump into the public debate over such a scandalous organizational
crisis, whether his or her views are based in fact or fantasy.
Scandal is also distinct in that often the crisis is one of confidence or
legitimacy; in the political or public arenas, the loss of legitimacy may be as
much of a death knell as the public’s discovery of a manufacturer’s unsafe
product.6 Organizations that are soothed by and develop crisis responses from

1. Christine M. Pearson et al., Managing the Unthinkable, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS,
Autumn 1997, at 51, 51.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 51–52.
5. JOHN B. THOMPSON, POLITICAL SCANDAL: POWER AND VISIBILITY IN THE MEDIA AGE 20
(2000).
6. Elizabeth A. Hamilton, An Exploration of the Relationship between Loss of Legitimacy and the
Sudden Death of Organizations, 31 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 327 (2006).
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the notion that public opinions are a misrepresentation of what really happened
can be ambushed when they realize that the fuel for a scandal is not necessarily
what is true, but what people believe to be true or want to believe is true. The
fact is that scandal can result from and be fueled by a total distortion of reality.
Scandals of this kind are also dissimilar to other forms of organizational
crisis because they tend to become a stage upon which ongoing societal conflicts
are acted out. For example, when Denny’s Corporation was accused of a
longstanding pattern of discrimination against nonwhite customers, the
accusations and ensuing legal battle spotlighted ongoing racial tensions in the
United States.7 Many other corporate scandals of the recent past (for example,
that involving Enron)8 are fueled by perceptions of corporate greed and a
breach of ethical standards. Such scandals also spotlight mistreatment of
“ordinary people” by the privileged class.
[It is important to] separate out the two distinct realms of discourse that are operative
in . . . scandal: the formal legal one, [and] the informal public one. Each realm has
different standards of judgment, and plays a different role. The formal, legal realm is
organized to determine the legal guilt or innocence of the individuals accused, while it
should be clear that the public realm—that diffuse and loose amalgam of both formal
9
and informal communications—cannot determine individual legal guilt or innocence.

The recognition of the two “realms of discourse” accompanying organizational
scandal highlights particularly the ways in which the public realm must become
a cultural site worthy of equal attention to the involved organizations.10
Organizations must engage the legal and the public notions of accountability
and responsibility, even if these notions seem irrational to a traditional business
sensibility that is based only on truth and facts.
In sum, these ideas suggest that organizations face particular challenges in
managing events that trigger a public scandal. Any actions, decisions, or public
statements (or lack thereof) made in the heat of the moment can quickly fuel
the crisis to even more-extreme levels. First-order crises about the “facts” can
quickly evolve into second-order crises about the reaction to the “facts.”11
Further, organizations failing to realize that the scandal moves far beyond a set
of legal facts or trusting that all will be vindicated when the real facts are
revealed are likely to be missing the boat in their crisis response. Such scandals
are the site where society is playing out its deepest problems and concerns
about longstanding social ills: scandals involve deep human needs to identify
“good” and “evil,” and to avenge bad behavior.

7. See generally JIM ADAMSON, THE DENNY’S STORY: HOW A COMPANY IN CRISIS
RESURRECTED ITS GOOD NAME AND REPUTATION (2000).
8. Richard W. Stevenson, Why a Scandal Became a Spectacle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 4
(Week in Review), at 1.
9. Linda Martin Alcott, Director of Women’s Studies at Syracuse University, Speech at the
Inauguration of the Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media at Syracuse
University (Sept. 19, 2006).
10. Id.
11. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 24.
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In the face of these challenges, most organizational leaders would simply be
glad to emerge from the scandal with their organizations’ reputations relatively
unscathed and with organizational and community members relatively
unharmed. After tiresome damage control, the urge to “get back to business,”
to get out of the limelight of media and public scrutiny, and to put the crisis
behind the organization is likely to be quite strong for the organization’s leaders
and members. To expect that the organization can actually use the crisis as a
basis for renewal and rejuvenation may seem not only counterintuitive but also
overly demanding after such trying experiences. The leadership of many
organizations are simply relieved and fortunate to have returned to a state of
normalcy, so efforts to use the crisis as a springboard for positive change are not
even considered. Other leaders of other organizations intuit that there are
powerful lessons embedded in the crisis, but their learning stops when they have
determined how not to let that same bolt of lightning strike twice. This is in line
with the oft-cited criticism that the U.S. Army is preparing to fight the previous
war.12
Is it really possible that an organization can use its experience with a highprofile scandal as a springboard for renewal and positive change? The next
section offers examples of some organizations that have faced crises and have
benefited from the springboard. This ability to transform negative events into
organizational transformation and renewal can be called “hyper-resilience”:
such organizations achieve much more than simply bouncing back to the status
quo (that is, resilience), but use their experiences to move to previously
unrecognized levels of organizational effectiveness. The lacrosse scandal at
Duke University illustrates the ways in which an organization can transform the
trauma associated with scandal into an opportunity for positive organizational
transformation.
III
THE LACROSSE SCANDAL: FROM CRISIS
TO RENEWAL—OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE
On a fateful night in March 2006, an exotic dancer arrived ready to perform
at an alcohol-infused party held by the Duke lacrosse team.13 Who would have
known that the dancer, hired by members of the team, would later accuse three
players of raping her at the party and that these accusations would lead to a
spiral of media frenzy and public scrutiny that would put Duke in the spotlight
for months to come? The dancer was African American, had served in the U.S.
military, was a student at the cross-town, historically black North Carolina
Central University, and apparently was supporting herself through exotic

12. See, e.g., Thomas Vinciguerra, Waging Small Wars, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2004,
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 7.
13. Susannah Meadows & Evan Thomas, What Happened at Duke?, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 2006, at
40.
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dancing.14 Although the three white male players publicly and steadfastly
asserted their innocence, the county district attorney indicted the young men.15
Following university protocols, Duke President Richard Brodhead placed the
two students who had not yet graduated on interim suspension.16 President
Brodhead also suspended the remaining games on the lacrosse schedule out of
concern—at least in part—for the safety of the team members.17 In the months
following the alleged incident, a firestorm of media and public interest swept
around the case, in no small part because the case involved hot-button issues
such as race, class, and gender.18
In time, it became clear that there was no case for rape on that March night,
resulting in the university’s offer to fully reinstate the accused players, as well as
in the district attorney’s removal, disbarment, and conviction for criminal
contempt of court for withholding evidence that would have exonerated all
members of the Duke lacrosse team.19 In the wake of the scandalous crisis,
President Brodhead formed five different committees on campus, each of which
was charged with examining various aspects of Duke’s response to the scandal
and uncovering underlying issues that may have contributed to the crisis.20 A
close reading of the committees’ reports shows that Duke had an interest in,
and the potential to learn from, its experiences.21 But is it really possible that
Duke University could use this scandalous crisis as a springboard for
organizational renewal and change?
Organizational crises present (at least) six opportunities for crisis renewal
and transformation that organizations can experience in the wake of
unfortunate circumstances.22 These outcomes are (1) seeing stakeholder
relationships in a new light, (2) reasserting or reshaping organizational mission
and values, (3) recognizing vulnerabilities, (4) engaging in issue leadership, (5)

14. Samiha Khanna, Mother, Dancer, Accuser, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), April 16, 2006,
at A1.
15. Benjamin Niolet et al., Lacrosse Players’ Lawyers Object, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
Mar. 30, 2006, at A1; Benjamin Niolet et al., Third Duke Player Indicted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), May 16, 2006, at A1.
16. Duke Office of News & Communication, Looking Back at the Duke Lacrosse Case (July 3,
2007), available at http://news.duke.edu/lacrosseincident.
17. Id.
18. Meadows & Thomas, supra note 13.
19. Duke Office of News & Communication, supra note 16.
20. Id.
21. William G. Bowen & Julius L. Chambers, The Duke Administration’s Response to Lacrosse
Allegations (May 4, 2006); James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., Report of the Lacrosse ad hoc Review
Committee (May 1, 2006); Academic Council Student Affairs Committee, An Examination of Student
Judicial Process and Practices (May 1, 2006); Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee, Report of
the Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee (Feb. 15, 2007).
22. Judith A. Clair & Ronald L. Dufresne, Changing Poison into Medicine: How Companies can
Experience Positive Transformation from a Crisis, 36 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 63, 65 (2007)
[hereinafter Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison]; Judith A. Clair & Ronald L. Dufresne, Phoenix
Rising: Positive Consequences Arising from Organizational Crisis, in POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IN
BUSINESS ETHICS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 143–64 (Robert A. Giacalone et al. eds.,
2005).
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renovating underlying organizational structures, and (6) better understanding
the wholeness of organizational life.23 Even organizations facing scandalous
crises might find ways to transform the difficult circumstances of scandal into an
opportunity for positive transformation, and the Duke scandal serves as a basis
for exploration. Before moving forward, however, it is important to emphasize
that none of these consequences is likely to be stumbled upon by luck. They are
instead brought about by leaders—both formal and emergent—throughout the
organization who seek through daily encounters to transform the world around
them and who see crisis as an opportunity to continue doing so.
A. Seeing Stakeholder Relationships in a New Light
One way an organization can achieve hyper-resilience following a
scandalous crisis is through heightened attention to stakeholder relationships.
This may take the form of either recognizing one’s impact on a previously
unrecognized stakeholder or realizing the importance of a formally minimized
stakeholder. “Town–gown” issues invariably arise whenever large institutions
like Duke exist within a relatively less-privileged community, and the issues are
heightened even more when the majority of the students are from elsewhere
and do not share demographic backgrounds (that is, are relatively more
privileged—educationally, financially, and in other ways—than those in the
surrounding community). The crisis that beset Duke University appears to have
strengthened the recognition of the local civic community as a strategic partner.
The lacrosse scandal not only revealed Duke’s close stakeholder relationship
with its immediate campus neighbors, but also the university’s legal relationship
with public authorities such as the Durham Police Department and the county
and state prosecutors’ offices. With these new insights, Duke seemed to have an
opportunity to strengthen its public image, to better respond to stakeholder
concerns, and to transform its relationships with stakeholders. In fact, some of
the committee reports relied specifically on reaching out to the community,
neighborhoods, and organizations (such as the police) as a basis for building
insights about vulnerabilities and opportunities for change. These reports offer
evidence that the scandal itself paved the way to potentially stronger and moredirect relations between Duke and its surrounding stakeholder community.
B. Reasserted or Reshaped Organizational Mission and Values
Hyper-resilience can also be seen when organizations emerging from crises
recognize the need for and work to reassert or reshape organizational missions
and values. Kierkegaard referred to this idea as “upbuilding,”24 which in this
context entails using the organization’s self-image in the public domain as a

23. Cf. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 65.
24. Douglas Steele, Introduction to SOREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE (Douglas Steele
trans., 1938) (1847).
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motivator to remind itself of what it really wishes to be.25 In the aftermath of the
alleged rape scandal, Duke was portrayed by some—including Rolling Stone—
to be a bacchanalian, elitist institution, and the lacrosse team to be a
microcosmic depiction of this image.26 This portrayal may have contributed to
President Brodhead’s naming of the Campus Culture Initiative Steering
Committee, charged with studying the campus culture since the university
recognized that, guilty or not, the players involved were embedded in a culture
that may have contributed to underlying problems. The committee observed,
[L]ast spring’s lacrosse event and its ensuing controversies evoked strong emotions
and discussions about issues of race and gender, class and privilege, difference and
respect, athletics and academics, and town and gown. While these social and cultural
issues have long been of concern in our larger society and on Duke’s campus, these
events publicly challenged Duke to closely re-examine itself to find more effective
ways to enhance the sense of social responsibility and mutual respect among members
27
of its community.

Brodhead called for the university to take the lead in reasserting and
reshaping its own values around inclusion and diversity, and the committee
identified ways to do so by, for example, addressing inherent, hierarchical social
structures related to class, race, and gender within Duke’s community.28 This
initiative seems to have had the potential to move beyond simply recovering by
learning surface lessons; it instead sought deeper, long-lasting change. Whether
this change is realized depends heavily on the organization’s ability to translate
its new insights and good intentions into meaningful action.
C. Recognizing Vulnerabilities
Crisis can be invaluable in exposing organizational risks:
A brush with crisis acts as a reality check. Crisis can not only reveal risks that leaders
and other decision makers had so far not recognized, but also can temper out-ofcontrol or poorly monitored organizational behaviors and decisions. Just as the
alcoholic hits rock bottom before giving up alcohol abuse, so too must some
organizations experience a brush with major failure for leaders to be ready to change
organizational behaviors for the better. . . .
...
. . . [A]n organizational crisis can also shake up inaccurate assumptions held by
leaders, managers, and/or employees about what is occurring and why. This increased
awareness can facilitate learning from crisis, if an organization is more ready to
critically examine organizational blind spots and vulnerabilities. While it’s painful,
managers and leaders would have probably never learned how to be more effective
29
without the crisis experience.

25. Richard P. Nielsen & Ron Dufresne, Can Ethical Organizational Character Be Stimulated and
Enabled?: ‘‘Upbuilding’’ Dialog As Crisis Management Method, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 311, 312 (2005).
26. Janet Reitman, Sex & Scandal at Duke, ROLLING STONE, June 15, 2006, at 70.
27. Campus Culture Initiative Steering Committee, supra note 21, at 1.
28. Letter from Richard H. Brodhead, President, Duke University, to the Duke Community (April
5, 2006).
29. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 67.
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A previously unrecognized vulnerability evident in the wake of the Duke
lacrosse scandal is the organization’s lack of control (relative to other kinds of
organizations) over which organizational members make public statements—
and then, when and for what purpose. Beyond the effect of statements of
individuals in the public domain, the crisis was inflamed by public statements
made by faculty and students. The airing of disagreements among
organizational members over the facts and implications of the scandal further
exacerbated the crisis. It would be unusual in most corporate settings for
organizational members to freely speak out in public about the circumstances of
an event or issue facing the company, unless the member was an organizational
leader or spokesperson, a whistleblower (protected—ostensibly—by federal
law), or a former employee. Ironically, what would normally be considered a
strength in any university—rich and public discourse around organizational and
community issues—became a source of vulnerability for the university as
individuals within the Duke community voiced their personal reactions to the
case. The challenge for Duke under these circumstances was to recognize that
this aspect of university life was both a vulnerability and a strength, to find ways
to engage the inevitable debates in ways that would build its core strengths
rather than undermine them, and to learn from such disagreements in a context
of respectful and honest dialogue.
D. Engaging in Issue Leadership
In the crisis-management and crisis-communication communities, issue
management refers to an organization’s developing a coherent set of talking
points that will help the organization minimize long-term reputational damage.30
Again, the goal of this approach is resilience. For a hyper-resilient outcome,
however, some organizations move beyond issue management and instead
engage in issue leadership. Issue leadership means that public crisis can afford
an organization the opportunity to take a leadership role in engaging with a
problem that similarly plagues other organizations. Others can therefore learn
vicariously without suffering the personal costs of their own crisis. For example,
in the medical field, highly publicized errors led Johns Hopkins to become an
issue leader on patient safety and the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston
to become an issue leader on avoiding medication errors.31 Given the public
nature of issue leadership and the public airing of “dirty laundry” it entails, this
form of hyper-resilience is not possible when an organization has a bunker
mentality, as when legal action is pending. Since the issues at work in the Duke
case—race and gender, openness and privacy, class and privilege, difference and

30. Kate Miller, Issues Management: The Link Between Organization Reality and Public
Perception, PUB. REL. Q., Summer 1999, at 5.
31. Remaking American Medicine: The Silent Killer (PBS television broadcast Oct. 5, 2006);
Richard A. Knox, Overdoses Still Weigh Heavy at Dana-Farber More Than Year After Tragedy, Cancer
Institute Works to Balance Research Mission, Crucial Details of Patient Care, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26,
1995, at A1.
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respect, athletics and academics, town and gown—are faced by virtually every
university in the country, there was a real opportunity for Duke to take a public
leadership role on any or all of these issues. It would seem that Duke’s
commitment to engage in conversations such as The Court of Public Opinion32
indicated at least an attempt at exercising issue leadership.
E. Renovation of Underlying Organizational Structures
All organizations, especially organizations that have existed for some time,
have deep-rooted structures in the form of reporting relationships, technologies,
and physical structures such as office layout. These structures become deeply
engrained approaches to organizational functioning because they are efficient
or effective. Or perhaps they arose for idiosyncratic reasons but soon became
taken-for-granted ways of functioning. Scholars who study organizational
change recognize that such structures can make change difficult under normal
circumstances.33 When change is on the horizon, people may resist because they
fear that they will lose the efficiencies associated with “the ways we’ve always
done things.” Often, people rely on the ways that things were always done
rather than on new practices because they lack the time, energy, or will to make
changes. For example, despite the shifting technological landscape around it,
Eastman Kodak long clung onto its identity as a photographic film company,
thereby becoming a late entrant into the digital imaging market.34
Organizational crises, however, offer an impetus, a necessity, and an
opportunity to change deeply engrained structures in ways that would not have
been possible otherwise. In the most extreme cases, crises result in the literal
destruction of organizational structures, as in organizations demolished in the
events of 9/11.35 In such cases, the crisis, while tragic in losses and costs incurred,
offers new and fresh opportunities to build organizational structures from the
ground up. Although in some ways it would be comforting to rebuild the
structures to replicate their precrisis form, the crisis brings the possibility for a
hyper-resilient response that reimagines what structures might be more
effective. Such was the hyper-resilient response by investment bank Sandler
O’Neill + Partners to its near-destruction on 9/11.36 The company not only
reconstructed its physical and electronic infrastructure, it sought new lines of
business and committed itself to caring for employee and family well-being—
not just profitability.37

32. Duke University School of Law, The Court of Public Opinion: The Practice and Ethics of
Trying Cases in the Media (Sept. 28–29, 2007).
33. Cf. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951).
34. James Bandler, Kodak Shifts Focus from Film, Betting Future on Digital Lines, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 25, 2003, at A1.
35. Cf. Steven F. Freeman, Larry Hirschhorn, & Marc Maltz, The Power of Moral Purpose: Sandler
O’Neill & Partners in the Aftermath of September 11th, 2001, ORG. DEVELOPMENT J., Winter 2004, at
69.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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In crises such as a scandal, the limits of entrenched structures may be
exposed to the organization, and its impetus for creating change can be stronger
than previously. For example, in the Duke lacrosse case, it is evident that the
“silo” approach to organizational structure, wherein each department tends to
see issues through its limited departmental perspective, obstructed vital
communications within Duke, and slowed down top administrators’ awareness
of critical information and the organization’s response to the scandal.38 The
scandal further exposed the problems that can arise when there is a separation
between the athletic and the academic sides of the organization, and
underscored the need for an integrative community. Although organizations
experiencing scandal (and not the physical destruction of organizational
structures) do not have the opportunity to literally build new structures from
the ground up, the scandal does provide legitimization and an urge for change
that may not have existed previously. Organizational members who may have
resisted change in the past may be more aware of the need for and more open
to making changes.
F. Enhanced Understanding of the Wholeness of Organizational Life
Organizations frequently function as if there is organizational life and
nonorganizational life, and never the two shall meet. To illustrate, many
organizations assume that emotions have no place at work, and that employees
will be most effective if they leave their emotional lives at home.39 However,
organizational crises—which frequently involve death, destruction, failure, and
other ills—highlight that emotions need to be recognized as part of
organizational life and that failure to appreciate the emotional aspects of worklife, especially in a crisis, can actually fuel the flames of a crisis. Further, positive
emotions—such as passion and compassion—can improve rather than diminish
organizational effectiveness.40 Organizations that have experienced a crisis may
be better able to recognize passionate and compassionate feelings of
organizational members and stakeholders, and to tap into those feelings as a
source of renewal.
For example, while painful and hurtful, one thing the Duke scandal exposed
was the diverse and strong feelings within the Duke community about issues of
race, class, and gender.41 The scandal at Duke provided a bird’s eye view of
these differences, and while the sting of disagreements may still have been
evident in the university community, leaders at all levels of the university had
an opportunity to recognize the diversity of emotions and personal experience
within that community and to tap into the strength of feeling as a motivating

38. Bowen & Chambers, Duke Administration’s Response, supra note 21, at 14.
39. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 69.
40. Jane E. Dutton, Monica C. Worline, Peter J. Frost, & Jacoba Lilius, Explaining Compassion
Organizing, 51 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 59 (2006).
41. Anne Blythe & Jane Stancill, Frustrations Boil at Duke, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC),
Mar. 28, 2006, at A9.
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force to create positive change. To undertake change within a contentious
environment, such as one involving scandal, would entail great skill at managing
emotions at all levels of the organization.
As a second illustration, organizations frequently fail to appreciate that the
ills and strengths of their communities are also likely to be evident within the
context of the organizations themselves. For example, regarding diversity and
inclusion, many organizations assume that racial, ethnic, religious, class, or
gender strife is not present in their organization, or has been well-managed.
Although the organization may have tried to effectively manage its diverse
workforce, the organization itself may be embedded in a local community or,
more broadly, a geographic area where such issues are prevalent and
unresolved. A brush with scandal of the kind experienced by Duke University
highlights how the organization is interrelated with its broader community. This
makes evident that Duke must both encourage a more diverse and inclusive
environment within its own walls as well as be a force for change within the
civic community as a whole.
There is some evidence, based on President Brodhead’s public statements
and the committees’ reports, that the lacrosse scandal crystallized the
inequalities within Duke’s own community and the community at large and
indicated that leadership for change was needed within and outside of the Duke
University community.42 Duke has a real opportunity—one that may not have
been recognized or fully appreciated in the past—to break down the false
barriers between, and embrace the wholeness of life within, diverse
communities.
IV
NEXT STEPS TO CREATING POSITIVE
TRANSFORMATION: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Seeking positive transformation or hyper-resilience in the midst of a
scandalous crisis is in many ways about managing tensions. There is tension
between the motivation to get on with the organization’s life and the motivation
to ask the deeper—and more painful—questions that may crystallize the
broader lessons to be learned. There is tension between leaders presenting
themselves as competent and confident and their being, in fact, humble,
uncertain, and vulnerable. There is tension between knowing what really
happened and recognizing what others think really happened. There is also the
ongoing tension between attending to the day-to-day challenges and duties of
running the organization and attending to the practices and commitments that
can ward off crisis or enable a hyper-resilient response.
The management of these tensions is by no means an easy exercise. It is the
exceptionally rare organization that can mindfully realize even one of the

42. Committee Reports, supra note 21; Brodhead Letter, supra note 28.

10__DUFRESNE & CLAIR__CONTRACT PROOF.DOC

212

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

11/18/2008 11:44:26 AM

[Vol. 71:201

aspects of hyper-resilience discussed above. One reason for this is the incredible
time pressure organizations and their leaders face during a scandalous crisis. In
the for-profit business world, time horizons have been compressed from the
long-term down to quarterly earnings reports and further down to daily—and
even minute-by-minute—share prices.43 Even minor issues that affect share
price negatively can merit extensive coverage on 24-hour news channels such as
CNBC. Today, businesses, governments, universities, and any other
organization imaginable exist in a world where news needs to be generated and
covered around-the-clock and where nameless bloggers can inform and
misinform millions with a keystroke. Organizations, then, feel great pressure to
act decisively, and successful problem-solving may still leave the deeper issues
unexamined. When dozens of news trucks lined up on Duke’s campus, it was
undoubtedly even more challenging to think imaginatively, openly, and
reflectively about how the entire community might grow through the public
scandal.
Another reason why hyper-resilience is so difficult to achieve is because of
the competing interests of organizational stakeholders. There can be wildly
varying views about what response an organization should pursue, depending
on if one is asking—in the classic business example—owners, managers,
employees, customers (past, present, and future), suppliers, neighbors,
regulators, competitors, et cetera. The most salient stakeholder tends to be the
one with the loudest voice, and often that voice can argue for a quick return to
the status quo. The problem of competing interests is exacerbated in moreorganic organizations like universities where it may be impossible for
administrators, faculty, staff, and students to agree on what the crisis is about or
even that there is a crisis in the first place. For example, while the Duke lacrosse
case seemed to gain national traction as a scandalous crisis involving issues of
race, class, and gender, some members of the Duke community framed the
issues instead in terms of higher-education institutions’ role as advocates for
civil liberties.44
There are often multiple orders of crisis or scandal45—and this appears true
in the Duke lacrosse scandal as well. On the first order, the crisis may have been
about what did or did not happen in that house on the night of the lacrosse
party. Framed in these terms, it appears that the first-order crisis was one of
“out-of-control,” privileged student-athletes. On the second order, the crisis
may have been about how Duke and its community responded to the
allegations of the first order. Here, the crisis may have been about any number
of things: a rush to judgment by civic and university authorities, academic
freedom of faculty to advocate their perspective, due process for the accused

43. The McKinsey Global Survey of Business Executives: Business and Society, MCKINSEY Q., July,
2006, at 33.
44. STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007).
45. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 24.
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and for the nonaccused lacrosse players and coaches, “trial” in the court of
public opinion, and concern for public safety. Depending on one’s perspective,
the second-order crisis could have been about any, all, or none of these issues.
Even more confounding in this case was that, as the public eventually learned,
there was no legal case underlying the first-order crisis. One political scientist’s
model of scandal assumes that something untoward does in fact happen to
trigger the cascade of obfuscation, leaking, and reacting that constitutes the first
days of scandal.46 Yet when nothing (legally) untoward happens initially, scandal
can still explode. How then, in this fractured domain, might an organization
possibly focus on anything other than mere survival?
V
CONCLUSION
One of the enduring insights from the research on organizational crisis
management is that effective crisis management begins long before crisis
strikes. It follows that the management of tensions inherent in seeking hyperresilience following a scandal must also begin long before the scandal erupts.
This is not to say that every possible scandal or crisis be scripted with a
playbook. Rather, organizations need to engage in practices and habits that will
increase their chances of realizing hyper-resilient outcomes when the time
comes. Three such disciplines are a commitment to personal transformation, a
commitment to interpersonal engagement, and a commitment to experimenting
with learning structures.47 Taken together, if these disciplines were adopted
seriously throughout an organization, the likelihood of hyper-resilience would
be greatly enhanced.
The idea behind developing a commitment to personal transformation is the
need for leaders to develop a more post-conventional worldview in which
paradox and tension are welcomed, not shunned. A post-conventional
worldview recognizes that perception and reality can and do differ, and that
reasonable people can draw radically different conclusions based on seemingly
identical stimuli. A commitment to interpersonal engagement is about seeing
organizations as human systems and human—not technological—
accomplishments. This discipline entails being curious and engaging in dialogue
with others to uncover their assumptions and blind spots. Last, a commitment
to experimenting with learning structures challenges organizations to find ways
to learn collectively from relatively minor failures—both potentially to avoid
larger failures and to have the means to learn from larger failures. Learning
structures can be after-action reviews or other techniques to ensure collective
reflectivity and to encourage everyone in the organization to take ownership of
the learning process. It should be apparent that these three disciplines are
cumulative. It is impossible to take interpersonal engagement seriously without
46. Id.
47. Clair & Dufresne, Changing Poison, supra note 22, at 72.
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caring about personal transformation, and learning structures will fail without
commitment to learning from each other.
Perhaps one of the reasons why hyper-resilience following organizational
crisis is so rare is that organizations and leaders that commit to these disciplines
are exceptionally rare. At its heart, this rarity highlights the deep tension
between our assumptions that leaders should be decisively heroic and the need
for leaders to be vulnerably open. In the final analysis, while organic
organizations such as universities may be susceptible to difficulties in managing
crises or scandals due to their fractured natures, such organizations may prove
to be the best training grounds for the type of organizational leadership that is
open and curious for multiple perspectives. As such, they may provide the best
hope for realizing hyper-resilience in the face of scandalous crisis.

